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ABSTRACT
Information governance is becoming an important aspect of organisational
accountability. In consideration that information is an integral asset of most
organisations, the protection of this asset will increasingly rely on
organisational capabilities in security. In the medical arena this information is
primarily sensitive patient-based information. Previous research has shown that
application of security measures is a low priority for primary care medical
practice and that awareness of the risks are seriously underestimated.
Consequently, information security governance will be a key issue for medical
practice in the future. Information security governance is a relatively new term
and there is little existing research into how to meet governance requirements.
The limited research that exists describes information security governance
frameworks at a strategic level. However, since medical practice is already
lagging in the implementation of appropriate security, such definition may not
be practical although it is obviously desirable. This paper describes an ongoing action research project undertaken in the area of medical information
security, and presents a tactical approach model aimed at addressing
information security governance and the protection of medical data.
Keywords: Medical informatics computing, computer security, security
measures, data security, action research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Like most organisations, medical practice is increasingly dependent on IT
systems and data in electronic form. The information used is both
administrative and clinical in nature. In addition, like e-commerce, the
boundaries for health provision are becoming blurred. Where once the family
doctor was the main provider of healthcare, the services have become
distributed (Williams and Mahncke, 2006). The increased push for shared
electronic health records compounds the security issues in this environment.
There is a need to ensure a secure and trusted environment for the use and
transference of sensitive personal information. Von Solms (2000, 2006)
describes the ‘waves’ of information security as technical, management,
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standardisation and most recently information security governance. Whilst the
corporate world has faced these waves head on, the medical profession has
been slow to progress past the first wave. The existing tactical policy approach
taken by organisations to information security is becoming inadequate as it
does not reflect the changing electronic environment and its attendant risks, nor
does it address the increasingly important issue of accountability. This research
confirms the slow progression through Von Solms’ waves, and provides an
overarching practical model for medical practice to follow in order to secure
their medical information, and thus generate defensible information
governance.
2. BACKGROUND
Information governance is a relatively new idiom and echoes corporate
governance in its concern with accountability and fiduciary duty. Essentially it
encompasses integrity, including audit and control, risk management and
compliance. Similarly, information security governance extends the definition
of information security (confidentiality, integrity and availability) to
incorporate the legal and regulatory aspects of the context in which the IT
security is used. These definitions imply accountability at the highest level of
the organisation. Well known corporate failures in this area include Enron and
more recently WorldCom, and have given rise to legislation for senior
management responsibility such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley,
2002). These examples show that directors and CEOs are ultimately
responsible for the safety and security (in all its facets) of information in an
organisation (Von Solms, 2006).
In the face of strong penalties for violations of corporate governance directives,
it is time that organisations paid more attention to the protection of information
assets. Understanding the liability that organisations are open to is a strong
motivator for change in regards to security practices. In the medical field, such
protection has been encapsulated in legislation in some countries, for example
in the Unites States there is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA). However, other countries such as the United Kingdom, the
European Union and Australia do not have such defined legal statutes and rely
on national privacy laws (Heiser, 2004; Hinde, 2003).
Similarly, to fully appreciate how security contributes to governance, the
difference between information security management and information security
governance must be understood. Information security management is wholly
contained within information security governance. It is the process of
attempting to comply with legal and professional requirements, which is a key
part of information governance. It has been a criticism that “information
security is often treated solely as a technology issue, when it should also be
treated as a governance issue” (Business Software Alliance, 2003, p.2).
In the medical arena, the purpose of information security governance is to
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protect all health-related information to ensure confidentiality, integrity and
availability. However, more than this it is to ensure business continuity and
mitigate the risks of litigation by demonstrating and proving best practice and
robust procedure compliance. The process of governance must be integrated
with other standard processes if it is to be effective. A complementary review
of ISO17799/AS7799, ISO27001, HIPAA and other relevant security and
medical security standards can be found in Williams (2006c).
Surveys have shown that information security problems arise frequently from
human negligence rather than intentional attack (Cosgrove Ware, 2004) and at
the same time there has been a decline in the adherence to security standards.
Approximately 50% of intentional attacks are from current or past employees,
yet statistics in security show that over half of security breaches are never
reported. The 2006 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey suggests
that it is the users’ attitudes and resulting behaviours towards security practice
that requires the most attention and pose the greatest challenges for
organisations today. The survey reports that less is being spent on security than
in previous years, yet still only 10% of organisations consider that they manage
their computer security at an acceptable level. Concurrent with this is a decline
in the adoption and integration of IT security standards. Many security
incidents can be attributed to a lack of appropriate protection as a result of
inadequate staff awareness of security procedures and a poor security culture.
These surveys suggest that whilst increasing security awareness and
implementing measurable security activities is challenging, they may have the
greatest protective effect on security. In medical practice, these security issues
have been shown to be greatly underestimated and therefore it is imperative
that the security research provides assistance to this area of society (Holzer &
Herrmann, 2002; Williams, 2005).

2.1 Existing Information Security Governance Frameworks
Information governance and information security governance are immature
concepts and hence there is limited literature on the subject and even fewer
models and frameworks. The literature that does exist views information
security governance as a strategic function.
Moulton and Coles (2003) proposed that security governance should comprise
strategic objectives for security with strategies to meet these objectives,
identification of responsibilities and practices together with the associated
resources management, risk assessment, and regulative compliance. In
addition, they suggest that information security governance is “the
establishment and maintenance of the control environment to manage the risks
relating to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and its
supporting processes and systems” (Moulton & Coles, 2003, p.581). However,
this definition specifically omits the audit function, the operational security
activities and future development. It clearly focuses on applying information
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security governance at a strategic level.
In comparison, Posthumus and von Solms (2004) also classify information
security governance as an executive management responsibility. Their work
presents a framework for how information security can be dealt with at the
strategic level. The framework includes a ‘direct and control’ view of
information security governance, comprising both governance and
management responsibilities. This sees executive vision, strategy, and policy in
governance as ‘direct’, and the implementation and reporting from the
management side as ‘control’.
From a software security viewpoint, the National Cyber Security Partnership in
the US also proposed a framework specifically defining information security
governance in terms of the roles of executive management (Business Software
Alliance, 2003; Entrust, 2004; National Cyber Security Summit Task Force,
2004). This approach centres on business drivers, responsibilities and metrics,
and defines the actions needed to be taken by management to meet governance
through engagement of strategic management. Other organisations such as the
IT Governance Institute have also published resources that specify
“information security is not only a technical issue, but a business and
governance challenge that involves adequate risk management, reporting and
accountability. Effective security requires the active involvement of executives
to assess emerging threats and the organisation’s response to them” (IT
Governance Institute, 2006, p. 8).
The existing frameworks indicate that governance is a management issue and
should be initiated and controlled from this strategic organisational level. The
authors identified as the major contributors in the field of information
governance all indicate that the frameworks have been developed to provide
assistance in meeting information governance. Further, they acknowledge that
more support is required to interpret the directives at a tactical and operational
level.
3. METHODOLOGY
This research is part of an information systems based, action research project.
The objective of the research is to formulate practical models of assistance for
primary care medical practices to improve their security practices. Action
research was chosen as the overarching methodology because its cyclic nature
supports investigation and intervention in real-world situations (Baskerville,
1999; Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996; Dick, 2002; Susman, 1983;
Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). Action research is “widely cited as an exemplar
of a post-positivist social scientific research method, ideally suited to the study
of technology in its human context” (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996). It
allows for situational assessment, question raising, planning, fieldwork, and
analysis/reflection of interventions leading to sustainable improvement.
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It is imperative to involve those who would use and be affected by the
research, particularly in the medical domain where there has been a natural
opposition to investigation into, and challenge of, current processes (de
Dombal, 1993). Action research is one research methodology which fits the
primary care environment where both technological and human factors are
present, and where strong emphases on quality solutions are essential. Further,
it has been shown that collaborative research between researchers and
participants works well in the medical context where the purpose is to improve
the adoption of appropriate research findings (Hoddinott & Pill, 1997). Such
qualitative research, as action research principally is, can assist in
understanding the processes and capabilities of individuals in the health setting,
and promoting sustainable change (Muecke, 1997). A detailed discussion of
the research process can be found in Williams (2006a).
The research initially employed an exploratory pilot study, followed by indepth semi-structured interviews with primary care medical practices. The pilot
study aimed to investigate what issues were present in medical practice in the
use of electronic information. The research subjects were single and group
practitioners in private primary care practices in Australia. The results of this
study indicated that security and trust were significant issues in the use of
electronic information. After this initial action research cycle, the results were
critically reviewed and, consistent with the evolutionary nature of the action
research paradigm (Dick, 1993), further literature investigation was carried out.
This led to a refinement in research objectives and the initial development of
the model presented in this paper. Further, it motivated the development of a
security specific questionnaire based on the four competing security factors:
demographics, actual practice, issues and barriers, and practitioner
perception (Figure 1). These distinct competing factors in security were
chosen because of their importance to the existent social information system
and to the technological solutions that may be in place.

Figure 1. Competing factors in information security (Williams, 2006a).
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Information security research is often seen as one of the most intrusive and
sensitive types of information systems research. There exists a general mistrust
of any person outside an organisation attempting to gain information about the
security and security practices (Chang & Ho, 2006). Several researchers report
that to gain meaningful data in security it is preferable to use a small sample
and build relationships with those participants (Chang & Ho, 2006; Kotulic &
Clark, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998). Furthermore, to effect change using
action research, trust needs to be fostered with the participants in order to
undertake intervention in the target environment as the participants are
inclusive in the research. For these reasons the interviews were conducted with
group medical practices in Australia and the UK, with whom a relationship
could be developed. Each practice has a networked medical records and
administration system with access to the Internet. The participants share
information within the medical practice and seek information from the Internet.
The UK practice also shares information over the UK NHS Spine. Following
the data collection and analysis, the model was refined.
4. RESULTS
The results are a snapshot of the extensive qualitative interview data collected.
They provide examples of key factors in relation to responsibility, legal
requirements, and improvement in information security. All practices have a
networked computer system for administration and clinical records. Little
delineation of security roles was apparent. In relation to responsibility and the
question ‘Who is responsible for maintaining the security of your electronic
information?’ respondents reported:
“Well I suppose it has to be me [as Practice Manager]…although because
of the connections that we have to the [NHS] Spine, now I don’t know how
that changes my roles as far as security, as I do not really have any remit to
control them”; and
“At the moment it’s me [doctor] and then later on I will designate it to my
wife who is trained in IT so she can handle that”.
The interviews revealed identical approaches to security, which was reliance
on existing security measures provide by the application software and some
influence of profession accreditation requirements. In ‘actual practice’, whilst
policy was seen as important and acknowledged as a necessity, formal written
policy was either non-existent or not well developed. Secure access was
handled almost exclusively by the facilities available in the software
application packages used. The most obvious exception to this was the backup
procedures, which were well defined and usually formally written down.
Respondents revealed little explicit knowledge of the legal responsibilities
associated with security of electronic information. It should be noted though
that this does not preclude interviewees having tacit knowledge of the required
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obligations. In relation to the legal requirements and the question ‘Are you
aware of the practice responsibilities from a legal perspective in relation to the
security of your electronic information?’ respondents said:
“We get people to sign a confidentiality agreement”;
“I know it’s under some sort of act but I can’t quote on it. I just know it has
to be as confidential as possible and I’m sure that’s all they [laws] are
trying to say”; and
“There is an awareness. I don’t know the detail. I know it’s the practices’
responsibility to ensure the confidentiality of all patient related
information. There is a legal implication on me being the administrator of
the records, to ensure that those are all protected. I wouldn’t know the
detail of the legalities”.
In regards to security perception, there was a consistency between practices
where all interviewees thought that the application software used provided
sufficient protection in terms of security. Further, although some auditing and
security metrics are recorded, albeit automatically by application software and
the operating system, the interviewees revealed that these metrics are not
monitored. Such audit data could however partially fulfil some requirements of
information governance and could be used to review and inform security
processes. They may also be a key factor in the process of risk assessment.
Consequently improvement in information security was investigated through
the following questions:
1. What do you think constitutes good information security practice?
“I think it has to be up to the individual who’s doing it, I think you’ve
just got to be checking it all the time I think that’s the only security
you’ve got isn’t it you can’t rely on the computers to do that for you so
I think it’s monitoring constantly”; and
“We have to have a robust policy that is clearly communicated to all
people who use the building to serve the patients”.
2. What do you think would improve information security in your practice?
“I think we have to educate the staff more, especially the ones who are
not computer literate, that would definitely improve security”; and
“We don’t monitor [security] its just too much time and human
resources”; and
“I think an alarm system for the building, the protocols for email and
the internet, would be something I need to look at sooner rather than
later. That would cover the physical side and the educational side”.
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3. What are the issues in implementing security in the practice?
“The biggest issue was the need to look at it. It’s now on the strategic
document and there is now a recognition that we need to do something.
Knowledge is an issue for me. Where to gain that knowledge is also an
issue”; and
“We have some user issues, i.e. the capabilities of some of the staff.
They vary completely from the new partner who is really switched on,
to the one who used to be a typist who has come on board as an
excellent receptionist”.
In summary, the data collected identified the following issues:


No clear delineation of responsibility for security;



Risk assessment is not undertaken;



Policy is usually ‘ad hoc’ and not in written form;



Security measures are often implemented incorrectly or poorly
including monitoring of existing measures;



The capability and understanding of staff is in question in regards to
security;



Education of staff is required; and



More appropriate procedures could be put in place.

These characteristics are key operational aspects of information assurance and
governance.
Upon reflection the participants all reported that there was more that could be
done but time was an issue. In addition, policy was seen as a key constituent of
good information security practice. Increased knowledge and training, together
with more strategic direction, were identified as important issues that needed
addressing. Lastly, staff awareness and capability was seen as a fundamental
gap in the security implementation at each medical practice.
5. DISCUSSION
As a result of the pilot study, a literature investigation into current security
practices in primary medical care was undertaken. This, together with a review
of existing information governance models resulted in the first iteration of the
model. The model was further refined using the interview data collected into
the ‘Tactical Information Governance Security Model’ (TIGS Model) as shown
in figure 2. The model presented is specifically drawn using total quality
management (TQM) notation as this reflects the process and function of each
step in the model (Ahire, 2001). The following section discusses how the TIGS
model was constructed and explains its functioning.
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5.1 Model Construction
The model was derived from a synthesis of the literature and interview data
using three discrete yet convergent constructs. The first constructor was a
review of the literature on current information governance thinking, where it
was noted that there exists a discrepancy between the compliance to
information governance objectives and the operational management tasks to
meet these objectives (von Solms, 2005). This is further confirmed by the
interview data concerning the responsibilities and legal requirements of
information security. Therefore in the top level of the TIGS model there was a
need to ensure that the legal, ethical and professional responsibilities are
explicitly understood. This requires that a separation of duties and
identification of roles in security management are clearly defined within the
medical practice. The data collected suggests that practices do not have
dedicated security aware staff and that these roles are taken on by the doctors
themselves or the practice manager – neither of whom are trained for this role.
The second constructor was a review of existing information security
management practices. This resulted in a separation of associated processes
into defined modular steps (as indicated by the dotted arrows on the left hand
side of the figure 2). Usually this is termed merely ‘risk assessment’, which is a
basic security process however it can be further refined into several tasks. In a
medical application this should include:


Identification of assets to be protected (Williams, 2006d);



Risk assessment to obtain an overview of the anticipated threats and
risks to data (Williams 2006b);



Development of policies and procedures for those responsible for
security, and other staff, to follow (Williams, 2006c); and



Implementation of protection measures appropriate to the environment.

Whilst this delineation of tasks is adequate, it is not sufficient given the
medical context. Thus, a third constructor was used. As can be seen from the
data, improvement in information security, what constitutes good information
security practices as reported by the respondents is reasonable, yet such
measures are not conformed to or effectively implemented. Further, the
respondents identify that capability, as well as time, are significant issues.
Therefore, a capability assessment module was added to the model which can
then inform and drive the subsequent procedures, protections and controls.
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Tactical Information Governance Security Model (TIGS)
Knowledge of Legal
Requirements

Awareness of Ethical and
Professional Responsibilities

Identify Roles and
Responsibilites

Security Immunization
- Computer and communication assets
- Information, software, policy and people assets
- Data assets (corporate & patient information)
Williams (2006d)

Asset
Identification

Current
Information
Security
Management

Medical Data Security:
Are you informed or afraid?
Risk Assessment

- Responsibility and acceptable level of risk
- Assessment process – threat to risk correlation
- Matching controls to risk at acceptable level
Williams (2006b)

Policy
Implementation

- Based on law and government regulation
- Professional and ethical
- Limitations
- Deficiency in capability (SSE-CMM)
Williams (2006c)

Role of Standards

Concurrent research
Capability
Assessment

- Reviewing security capability models
- Development of capability model for medical
practice
- Creation of capability metric

Procedures

- Review and development of best practice based
on capability
- Embed security metrics to aid compliance

Concurrent research

Current
Information
Security
Management
Protection &
Controls

External
Validation

Compliance
Monitoring

Future research
- Monitoring and reporting processes for legal
compliance

Figure 2. Tactical information governance security model (TIGS Model).
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5.2 Model Function
The model specifies three prerequisites in order to make the governance
process effective. These are:


explicit knowledge of legal requirements in the use of patient and other
medical data held electronically;



awareness of ethical and professional responsibilities in the practice of
medicine and in the provision of healthcare; and



identification of the roles and responsibilities of staff and management
in the governance process.

These pre-requisites provide a contextual basis for the remainder of the
governance process.
The first three operations in the model are:


Asset identification – this is identification of all assets of the
information environment. This comprises both computer and
information assets, such as hardware, telecommunications and
networking equipment, software programs and operating system, human
resources, and patient, management and other clinical support data.
Further, practice policies and personnel intellectual property are also
assets to be protected and therefore should be included (Williams,
2006d).



Risk assessment - this process identifies the potential threats; matches
assets to the potential threats; assesses the level of risk to an asset and
the impact of the threat if it was successful; correlates the vulnerability
(level of risk of a threat to an asset); and assigns control measures to
each threat/asset combination (Williams, 2006b); and



Policy implementation – policy is the driver for operational
procedures. The policy is driven by the legal regulation, professional
accreditation and established industry best practice (Williams, 2006c).
Ethical considerations that may override security must also be
considered.

The results of the research indicate that these three areas require substantial
elucidation and explanation to enable medical practices to implement them
effectively.
The next organisational function of the model is capability assessment. An
analysis of access practices, together with the marginal delineation of the
security responsibility role, reflects the trustful environment within which these
are conducted. Despite some security measures being in place, the research
results indicate that awareness of the security risks is minimal and that the
capability of the practice to understand, and meet the legal requirements, is
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equally minimal. This evidence indicates significant gaps in knowledge and
execution of security practices. Thus, capability assessment is an essential
component of the TIGS model. It is envisaged that this capability will
necessarily be context specific and will include capability metrics for the
medical practice.
Procedure development is the next key aspect of implementing effective
security governance. The model specifies that procedure development should
be performed to reflect the capability of the medical practice whilst still
meeting the strategic intent of security requirements. To aid the evaluation of
the governance process, metrics should be embedded into the resulting
procedures. Further, the implementation of protection and controls must be
consistent with capability and allow external support to enhance capability if
required. This operation is dependent on the controls selected and may be
technology and socially based. These may include technical education in
security measure implementation and education to increase awareness of
security. The final operation is the evaluation of metrics and possible external
validation to meet the requirements of compliance monitoring and regulatory
directives. It is envisaged that the compliance monitoring may be able to be
embedded in the capability assessment and in the procedures used based on
these capabilities. The model is seen as a continuous process rather than a
discrete set of steps, and thus requires review and reiteration to be current and
effective.
As the model indicates, information security management is an integral part of
information security governance. This model is more inclusive than
information security management, in that it focuses on validation of the
process and procedures as evidentiary from a legal perspective. Yet more than
this, the model is differentiated by the inclusion of a capability assessment to
inform procedures development. The capability assessment model will provide
a substantive security metric that is derived from original requirements for the
context to which it is applied, in this case primary care medical practice. The
model is designed to provide an overarching structure for improvement in
security operation, implementation and execution. The modular structure of the
model means that it can be employed incrementally and each module in itself
may improve the overall security awareness and operations in the medical
practice. It is specifically developed to be utilised by non-IT and non-security
skilled medical and administrative staff, although such skilled personnel would
also benefit from the model.

5.3 Model Review
The model was reviewed by five general practitioners and three security
experts. Reviewers were asked whether they understood the model, their
perception of its practicality, ease of implementation and possible omissions
and improvements. All respondents commented that the model was
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understandable, although some doctors did not fully comprehend all of the
processes without supplementary explanation. Also, all reviewers indicated
that TIGS was a practically oriented model and addressed an area deficient in
medical practice. One general practitioner said it provides a “practical solution
to increase awareness and security for patient data in General Practice, which is
currently lacking” and another commented “it’s very interesting to see the
model like this. It is the sort of thing we don’t usually try to reduce into an
algorithm or a set of steps”. This was agreed with by another doctor: “I think
there needs to be a template. I think there needs to be an understanding of what
the pathways and processes are and the requirements of compliance at a
practice level”.
Compliance monitoring, including the affect of outside influences such as the
Government, was raised as a key area of deficiency in current practice. It was
suggested that the compliance process could be linked to medical association
accreditation, to ensure it meets minimum professional standards. One security
expert commented that the model is focused on process and procedure and not
just on technical implementation. Therefore it provides a holistic view of
security within a given context. Each procedure is coupled tightly with the
next, and as a result “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”. Another
security expert suggested that distinguishing between the strategic and
operational aspects would be the next step in implementing the model. Perhaps
the review can be summed up by one doctor who commented that “governance
is becoming more important for the patient as well as for the legal
requirements. It’s amazing that it has taken so long to come up with this
[model] as I have been recording records electronically for over 20 years”.
6. CONCLUSION
The immaturity of ‘information governance’ and the lack of research into its
application within the security discipline suggest that there is a need to develop
models of governance that can be practically applied. Medical practice has
been identified as one area that to date has been sluggish in its adoption of
security and is therefore open to greater security risk. The model presented in
this paper provides a method for mitigation of security risk whilst meeting the
requirements of information security governance within a corporate
framework. Whilst it is acknowledged that information security governance
should be a strategically driven process, this research proposes an applied,
interventionist and tactical approach be adopted for information security
governance in medical practice. This is particularly necessary given the
indicated lack of security awareness and capability displayed by primary care
medical practices within this study. Although the TIGS model approach to
improving security in medical practice is theoretical and operational testing has
not yet been undertaken, subsequent research is developing the capability
assessment process of the TIGS model. Following this, the model will be tested
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in several general practices in Australia and the UK. This future research will
bridge the gap between the theoretical models of security and practical
implementation of such models. This will ultimately provide practical guidance
in improving security practices consistent with best practice and the strategic
intent of information security.
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